Lords of Finance: The Bankers Who Broke the World

Lords of Finance: The Bankers Who Broke the World

Selected Book Details

  • Paperback
  • Author: Liaquat Ahamed
  • Publisher: Penguin (Non-Classics)
  • Release Date: December 2009
  • ISBN-10: 0143116800
  • ISBN-13: 9780143116806
  • List Price: $18.00

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Summaries and Customer Reviews provided by Amazon

Summary



Amazon Exclusive: Liaquat Ahamed on the Economic Climate

In December 1930, the great economist Maynard Keynes published an article in which he described the world as living in “the shadows of one of the greatest economic catastrophes in modern history.” The world was then 18 months into what would become the Great Depression. The stock market was down about 60%, profits had fallen in half and unemployed had climbed from 4% to about 10%.

If you take our present situation, 16 months into the current recession, we're about at the same place. The stock market is down 50 to 60 percent, profits are down 50 percent, unemployment is up from 4.5% to over 8%.

Over the next 18 months between January 1930 and July 1932 the bottom fell out of the world economy. It did so because the authorities applied the wrong medicine to what was a very sick economy. They let the banking system go under, they tried to cut the budget deficit by curbing government expenditure and raising taxes, they refused to assist the European banking system, and they even raised interest rates. It was no wonder the global economy crumbled.

Luckily with the benefit of those lessons, we now know what not to do. This time the authorities are applying the right medicine: they have cut interest rates to zero and are keeping them there, they have saved the banking system from collapse and they have introduced the largest stimulus package in history.

And yet I cannot help worrying that the world economy may yet spiral downwards. There are two areas in particular that keep me up at night.

The first is the U.S. banking system. Back in the fall, the authorities managed to prevent a financial meltdown. People are not pulling money out of banks anymore—in fact, they are putting money in. The problem is that as a consequence of past bad loans, the banking system has lost a good part of its capital. There is no way that the economy can recover unless the banking system is recapitalized. While there are many technical issues about the best way to do this, most experts agree that it will not be done without a massive injection of public money, possibly as much as $1 trillion from you and me, the taxpayer.

At the moment tax payers are so furious at the irresponsibility of the bankers who got us into this mess that they are in no mood to support yet more money to bail out banks. It is going to take an extraordinary act of political leadership to persuade the American public that unfortunately more money is necessary to solve this crisis.

The second area that keeps me up at night is Europe. During the real estate bubble years, the 13 countries of Eastern Europe that were once part of the Soviet empire had their own bubble. They now owe a gigantic $1.3 trillion dollars, much of which they won’t be able to pay. The burden will have to fall on the tax payers of Western Europe, especially Germany and France.

In the U.S. we at least have the national cohesion and the political machinery to get New Yorkers and Midwesterners to pay for the mistakes of Californian and Floridian homeowners or to bail out a bank based in North Carolina. There is no such mechanism in Europe. It is going to require political leadership of the highest order from the leaders of Germany and France to persuade their thrifty and prudent taxpayers to bail out foolhardy Austrian banks or Hungarian homeowners.

The Great Depression was largely caused by a failure of intellectual will—the men in charge simply did not understand how the economy worked. The risk this time round is that a failure of political will leads us into an economic cataclysm.

Customer Reviews

Average Rating: Score = 4.5 Score = 4.5 Score = 4.5 Score = 4.5 Score = 4.5

A fascinating, well written book

Rating: Score = 5 Score = 5 Score = 5 Score = 5 Score = 5


Liaquat Ahamed is a gifted writer and "Lords of Finance" is a fascinating, well written book.

"Lords of Finance" is a history of central banking, in the decades leading up to the Great Depression. This history starts before the first world war and then stretches through the post war years of German war reparations and the rise of the Nazis. Ahamed is a very engaging writing and the book pulls the reader in. The history related by Ahamed makes several interesting points. Although "gold bugs" still exist (people who believe in the gold standard for money), such a standard is absurd in the modern world. As modern industrial society was born, the gold standard created many more problems than it solved. Ahamed's history also reminds me that the idea that people do what is in their best interest is patently false. It was obvious to many that the first world war would be ruinous to Germany, France and England, although no one could have imagined how completely ruinous it would be. Yet the world, and especially Germany, rushed into war, shattering the world the world that people know.

There is no "true" history. In Ahamed's history, the Great Depression was caused by long running structural problems, not simply a stock market bubble or even the poorly considered short term financial policies. Today we tend to look back at the distant mirror of the Great Depression and wonder if it holds lessons for us today. All history holds lessons, of course, but those times seem very different from ours. Our current economic calamity stems also from long term policies, but in our times these policies were thoughtless regulation and dogmatic belief in the power of an unregulated market to cure all ills. Until there was a crash and then even the those claiming to believe in free markets were baying for bailouts.

I also recommend Robert K. Massie's book Dreadnought, which provides some background on the arms race and German insecurity and egotism that lead to World War I.

The eccentricities of economics and its human handlers

Rating: Score = 4 Score = 4 Score = 4 Score = 4 Score = 4

An honestly amazing tour through the lives of the four central bankers (Strong, Norman, Moreau and Schacht) who played key roles during the 1920's and early 30's.

If you desire an in-depth look at the role of the key economic players, and the evolution of economic/monetary policies of the U.S., U.K., France and Germany leading up to and during the Great Depression - this volume of scholarly insight is for you.

An excerpt is particularly poignant for the present day perils we are struggling with: "The Great Depression was not some act of God or the result of some deep-rooted contradictions of capitalism but the direct result of a series of misjudgments by economic policy makers, some made back in the 1920's, others after the crisis set in - by any measure the most dramatic sequence of collective blunders ever made by financial officials...authority at the Fed shifted to a group of inexperienced and ill-informed timeservers, who believed the economy would return to an even keel (emphasis is mine)." Pp. 501 & 503

This is truly a valiant contribution of a depth and breadth of a superbly crafted text, that I'm, quite certain, will inform the minds of students and scholars for many years to come. Mr. Ahamed - I look forward to your next contribution.

interesting perspective on major central bankers of the day

Rating: Score = 4 Score = 4 Score = 4 Score = 4 Score = 4

This book was enjoyable to read and its audience is wide. If one wants to get a sense of the people making policy decisions, their biases and sequential actions from the time of the first world war until the great depression, this is a very interesting read.

At the heart of the argument is the pegging to the gold standard was a distinct cause of the depression by overconstraining central banks flexibility. Keynes's interactions with Norman show the battle between fiat currency perspectives and commodity and physical store of value based perspectives (the aftermath shows the author's perspective on who eventually turned out to be right). The lessons one can draw from the book are well argued and I think valuable, personally i believe the argument, though I think some readers over-emphasize the gold standard vs some of the authors focus on the retribution tactics due to war reparations, and also how that formed german/french perspectives and strong adversarial nature.

At the end of the day though this book is enjoyable to read and illuminates the personalities and personal biasis that existed among the worlds major central bankers in their day. Whether one is convinced as whether the causes of the depression that are most focused on (ie the gold standard and the focus on money supply management that arose from hoarding and counterparty fear constraining ability to move or create money where it was needed rather than flowing) are in fact the principal components, you still manage to get a lot out of the book and i havent read other accounts that have taken this "middle of the road" approach in mixing the history as well as economics together. The result to me is a more historical rather than economically precise but that I think is a good thing as it eases one the subject and its a book that one can read quite "lightly".

Meanders too much

Rating: Score = 2 Score = 2 Score = 2 Score = 2 Score = 2

This book is full of interesting information about how four central bankers drifted from the gold standard and brought about the Great Depression. It is also a portend of the current world paradigm, which has reulted in a global financial system which will endeavor install the World Bank as the World Central Bank.

The book is interesting but meanders too much. I am finding that the author goes off on so many useless tangents and includes too muany details about irrelevant things, that I am just getting bored. As I am reading, I want the author to get to the point instead of wasting my time with trifling details.

If he wanted to delve more into the personalities, the book should have been as a narrative....or historical novel.

The book is too much work. I feel as though I have to chop through underbrush to get to the salient points.

I am only partially way through. I will finish the book, but will likely just skim the rest, scanning for interesting parts along the way.

Overall, good book, but written in a tedious, unfocused fashion.

'Twas ever thus

Rating: Score = 4 Score = 4 Score = 4 Score = 4 Score = 4

Lords of Finance is about the central bankers who contributed to the Great Depression, in England, France, Germany, and the US. One of the author's theses is that although we usually think of the Great Depression as having being caused by large impersonal forces beyond human control, in fact it was the discrete and wrong headed choices of these four bankers that helped bring down the international financial system, in large part by a stubborn adherence to the gold standard. So it makes one think of the recent financial crisis, and wonder if a handful of similar people could have made 'better choices.'

It's bracing stuff for economic history, even though you know sort of how the story resolves itself. Here the economics is very personal as the relationships between Strong (US Federal Reserve), Schact (Germany Reichsbank), Norman (Bank of England), and Moreau (Banque de France) determine the fate and character of what ultimately becomes the Great Depression--the opportunities lost, the bad policies, the pressure each faced at home from political considerations. In short, it is as exciting as a history of central banking could possibly be. It's also interesting to see the 'results' of their work on history in their personal lives. Norman, for example, was very kind about sending Schact 'care packages' after the war when he was interned and put on trial at Nuremberg.

The basic gist of the story emerges after WWI, when countries who temporarily went off the gold standard then return as an article of economic faith. (Keynes appears and is blistering in his critique throughout.) The problem is, to get back on gold, countries' currency must either devalue, or deflate, with particular consequences. Strong and Norman deflate, but Moreau and Schact devalue. Deflationary excess ruins the economy as prices shrink and consumers stop spending money waiting for prices to continue to go down. Devaluation risks hyperinflation, as it did in Germany, where the Reichsbank was printing trillions of marks a day and people would spend their wages as soon as they received them. The price of a cup of coffee would increase by the time you finished your first cup. The story of reparations and paying for them looms large in the story, the failure of financial ventures stressing the system, and the ultimate collapse in 1932 with bank 'holidays'--the end of the banking system. Gold was an aggravating factor in what was really a series of crises which occurred in a short period of time that collectively caused the Great Depression, from hyperinflation in the 20s to the Stock Market crash.

The personal angles of these individuals is also interesting. Strong maintained US policy through sheer force of personality, to some detriment to his own health and personal life. His wife left him and he eventually died on the operating table from a lifelong health condition, probably aggravated by stress, in 1928. His demise sent the Federal Reserve system into a tailspin, as it was apparently his force of personality that held the early system together, as it was consistently challenged by insitutional deficiencies (e.g. each of the 12 reserve banks could propose policy, but the Board could only veto, and although all 12 were 'equal', some banks like the NY Fed, were much more important financially than others)

All four central bankers had personal relationships with each other, wanting to help each other out, but also had to respond to very different political agendas at home, in addition to keeping gold sacrosant.

I was reading an exerpt of 'In Fed We Trust' from the WSJ recently, and I was struck by the 'personal being political' issues which haven't changed in almost 100 years. Bernanke's struggle to cobble together a deal in Fall 2008, ultimately persauding Treasury to go to Congress for a bailout, eerily echoed Strong's successor trying to put something together between the Hoover and Obama administrations.

Bernanke was in a similarly tough spot--in a way, similar to the 'global warming problem'. That is, by the time you can definitvely point out where everybody agrees 'hey this is a big effing problem' across party lines, it's too late and everybody fries. On Bernanke's view he should have acted earlier, but, he suppposes, if he had acted much later, he's pretty certain we would have seen Depression 2.0

That would not have been pretty at all. I'm not sure how long our society--and the world-- would have functioned with the banks closed, credit cards useless, no access to mutual funds, the stock market shut down, etc. Not bloody long working with just the dollars in your pocket!


In this light, it's funny to me how the California budget crisis sort of mirrors the issues of that period as well. Apparently this is much of their own making, with various propositions requiring certain funding by law which they cannot escape, plus some stringent budget balancing law (which sort of all ends up paralleling the Gold Standard). Apparently they've been able to cobble together a deal with alot of 'one offs' which will keep the State running another year. However, alot of the cuts are exactly the policies you *do not* want to enact in a recession--cutting jobs, salaries, etc. This is exactly the 'orthodoxy' Herbert Hoover was pursuing--balancing the budget--which itself helped aggravate the Depression. Hoover was educated at Stanford so maybe there's a funny parallel there, too. But I don't know alot about California budgetary politics and their actual constraints, so I am talking out of school on this one.